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Introduction
The episodes of financial turmoil and distress in the 1990s led researchers to not only look at currency crises as isolated events but also to take into consideration problems in the banking sector. Many of the countries that have experienced currency crises also have undergone domestic banking crises around the same time. Following Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) this twin crisis approach has induced an extensive theoretical and empirical research on the links between banking and currency crises. In contrast, the literature has so far neglected a second type of twin crisis, the simultaneous occurrence of currency and debt crises. Many countries which have faced balance of payments problems have been confronted with severe debt problems at the same time, with recent examples including Argentina, Ecuador and Russia.
As the literature has typically treated currency and debt crises as isolated events, it has not analyzed the decision to default and/or to devalue as part of a wider menu of policy choices. What kind of interrelations could exist between defaults and devaluations? First, the simultaneous occurrence of debt and currency crises could be caused by common macroeconomic factors that at the same time undermine a government's resolve to pay back its debt and to defend its exchange rate peg. Secondly, these events could be caused by some causal chains running from debt to currency crisis or the other way around. In this case defaults and devaluations could be either substitutes or complements.
Devaluations and (partial) defaults are substitutes if the emphasis is on the aspect of financing a given volume of public expenditures. If a government is constrained in its fiscal policy and cannot provide a large enough primary surplus to service its debt coming due, e.g. because of institutional problems or political pressure, it is left with the following alternatives to "finance" its expenditures (table 1):
• a (partial) default on its debt, i.e. an implicit tax on bond holders (debt crisis),
• an increase in the money stock, i.e. an inflation tax on money holdings implying a devaluation of the currency (currency crisis), or
• a combination of a devaluation and a default (twin crisis) According to this view the occurrence of a currency crisis should reduce the financing requirements of the government, thereby making a debt crisis less likely. Correspondingly, a debt crisis should lower the likelihood of a currency crisis. In contrast, currency and debt crises are complements if self-fulfilling expectations and contagion from one type of crisis to the other are relevant. Let us assume, that speculators expect a devaluation and demand higher interest rates which increase the financing requirements of the government. Then the government may not only try to reduce its real debt via inflation but also by defaulting on its debt coming due. Rational speculators take that possibility of a default into account and demand a higher risk premium, thereby further increasing the public financing requirement and making both a debt and a currency crisis more likely.
These interactions between debt and currency crises have so far been neglected in the theoretical and empirical research with the exception of the policy literature (e.g. Chiodo and Owyang 2002, Mussa 2002 ). In the field of currency crises the first-generation models emphasize the role of (monetary) fundamentals in a speculative attack (e.g. Krugman 1979 and Flood and Garber 1984) . The second--4 -generation models of the currency crisis, e.g. Obstfeld (1994) and (1996) , analyze how market expectations and fundamentals interact to give rise to multiple equilibria. For example if speculators believe that the government has less resolve to defend the exchange rate peg they demand higher interest rates to compensate for the risk of a devaluation. The increased debt service may lead the government to reduce its fiscal burden through inflation and subsequent devaluation, thereby validating the speculators' expectations. While currency crises have primarily been characterized as monetary phenomena, fiscal factors can play a major role in theses crises because of the interconnections between monetary and fiscal policy (see e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano 1990 , Obstfeld 1994 , and Benigno and Missale 2001 .
The extensive empirical work on currency crises, e.g. Eichengreen et al. (1995) , Frankel and Rose (1996) , and Bordo et al. (2001) , typically finds a higher likelihood of currency crises when the reserves are low, the foreign direct investment dries up, the monetary growth is high, the world capital markets are tight, and the domestic currency is overvalued. Institutional factors such as the degree of capital controls also help to predict currency crashes (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999) .
The theoretical literature on debt crises is vast also, while there are fewer empirical studies. Major factors in explaining debt crises are liquidity and expected deficits. If the creditors do not roll over all of the maturing debt, a default is the optimal choice for the debtor. If creditors are small and cannot coordinate there may be an equilibrium in which creditors do not roll over and the debtor defaults (Sachs 1984, Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2002) . Calvo (1988) and Alesina et al. (1990) developed the idea that a government partly repudiates its domestic currency debt through a surprise inflation in which high expected inflation rates are self-fulfilling. More recently, Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000) and Detragiache (1996) analyzed self-fulfilling creditor runs in models of sovereign debt. Chang and Velasco (1998, 2000) model foreign creditor runs when the borrowers are banks instead of the -5 -government. A common feature of these models of self-fulfilling creditor runs is that the bad equilibrium disappears if the amount of debt to be rolled over is small or the fundamentals are benign.
The empirical evidence on the role of debt maturity in debt crisis is mixed. Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Rodrik and Velasco (1999) find evidence that the ratio of short-term debt to reserves helps to predict reversals of capital flows. According to Mody (1998, 1999) risk spreads on emerging market debt instruments increase with the ratio of short-term debt to reserves. Finally, Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2002) report that liquidity variables such as the share of short-term debt, debt coming due, and foreign reserves are correlated with defaults concerning commercial creditors.
Among the conventional macroeconomic variables they only find the degree of overvaluation to predict defaults.
Recently, a few theoretical papers have explicitly integrated aspects of debt and currency crises in the framework of an intertemporal budget constraint, e.g. Calvo (1998), Aizenman et al. (2002), Benigno and Missale (2001) , Bauer et al. (2003), and Jahjah and Montiel (2003) . On the empirical side, Goldstein et al. (1998 ), Reinhart (2002 ), and Sy (2003 provide first steps to an empirical analysis of twin debt and currency crises. Goldstein et al. (1998) report evidence that currency crises are closely associated with the probability of sovereign defaults. Reinhart (2002) finds that sovereign credit ratings usually are downgraded after currency crisis and that these downgradings help to predict defaults. She takes that as an indication, that currency crises increase default risk. However, Reinhart (2002) does not directly control for the possibility, that currency and debt crises might be caused by common factors. In contrast, Sy (2002) concludes for a smaller and more recent sample of 13 emerging market economies during the period 1994 -2002 that currency crises are not linked to the probability of sovereign default.
Taken together, the nature of twin currency and debt crises is still an open question.
-6 -We analyze the interrelations between debt and currency crises in an Obstfeld (1994) type framework.
The welfare maximizing government decides on its monetary and fiscal policy by balancing the costs of alternative means of financing its expenditures, in particular the costs of an inflation/devaluation and the costs of a default. The government cannot commit itself to honor its debt and its exchange rate peg.
On the one side the government has an incentive to finance its expenditures by printing money implying subsequently inflation and devaluation in order to avoid the costs of a default. These costs include the loss of reputation on the international capital markets and the loss of GDP during the economic turmoil typically following a debt crisis. One the other hand it has an incentive to default on its debt in order to avoid the welfare costs of inflation and devaluation. As is typical for escape clause models, this can give rise to multiple equilibria with self-fulfilling twin debt and currency crises. There also exists the possibility of internal contagion from one policy field to another policy area within the same country. The expectation of a debt crisis can increases the debt service due to the higher interest rates thereby inducing a government to inflate and making a currency crisis more likely.
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 74 developing countries from 1975 to 2001. We find strong evidence that debt and currency crises have common fundamental causes. We find that reserve over imports ratio, domestic GDP growth rate, and FDI over external debt ratio affect both currency and debt crises. We also find that one-year lagged debt crisis strongly Granger causes currency crisis and two-year lagged currency crisis weakly Granger causes debt crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the interrelations between debt and currency crises in an escape clause framework. Section 3 presents the data used in our empirical analysis and provides some summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the statistical model and the main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
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A simple model of debt cum currency crises
The following model builds on the very insightful contribution of Obstfeld (1994) to analyze a model of self-fulfilling debt and currency crises. In Obstfeld (1994) the alternative instruments of government financing are printing money and levying taxes. In the context of debt and currency crises our focus is on the alternative of printing money and (partial) default. A main factor in explaining why a government gives in to default and devaluation expectations is the increased costs of servicing the public debt. Currency and debt crises are symptoms of the underlying weakness of the fiscal position. If the fiscal position were robust a government could always prevent a debt crises by borrowing to service its existing debt and it could also defend its currency by borrowing sufficient reserves.
The focus of our analysis is on the interaction between debt and currency crises. The government is not able or not willing to further increase its tax revenues or to reduce the expenditures, e.g. because of institutional problems or political pressure. In this situation the government could "finance" its debt coming due and the public expenditures through a default on its debt (debt crisis), through inflation and the subsequent devaluation (currency crisis) or through a combination of default and devaluation (twin crisis).
The world lasts for two periods, labeled 1 and 2. The government issues the domestic currency M, called the peso, and the foreign debt f denominated in dollars. The foreign debt f is risky and can be subject to default. f mn denotes foreign debt that is issued in period m and is coming due in period n. i is the nominal interest rates on the risky foreign currency debt, while i* is the nominal interest rate on risk free dollar debt. The government enters in period 1 with obligations to pay f 01 . Real government consumption in the two periods, g 1 and g 2 , is given exogenously. Purchasing power parity is assumed -8 -to hold so that the exchange rate is equal to the price level P, i.e. E = P with the foreign price level being unity. In period 1 the peso-dollar-exchange rate is fixed at E 1 , but it can be changed to E 2 in period 2.
The government's period 1 budget constraint is
(1)
The government finances its period 1 expenditures, i.e., the exogenous public expenditures E 1 g 1 and the debt coming due E 1 f 01 , by issuing foreign debt. Following the original sin hypothesis the government is constrained to issue foreign currency debt only (see Eichengreen and Hausman 2002) . For simplicity we assume that taxes are levied only in period 2.
In period 2 the government's budget constraint is
The government has to meet its period 2 debt service as well as its current expenditures. These obligations may be financed by an increase of (high-powered) money held in period 2 over the amount held in period 1, M 2 -M 1 , by an income tax τy, and by defaulting on the fraction η of the foreign debt f mn . As we are interested in the interaction of debt and currency crises we take the real tax revenues with the tax rate τ and output y as exogenously given.
Under the assumption of capital mobility the perfect-foresight equilibrium implies that the returns on the risk free world interest rate i* and the interest rate on the risky foreign debt i are equal ex post,
Private money demand is given by the simple quantity equation
The government aims at minimizing the distorting effects of debt and currency crisis. As the inflation/devaluation rate and the default rate are assumed to be zero in period 1, the loss function of the government can be written as
θ measures the relative weight of the exchange rate target vis-à-vis the debt service target in the government's loss function. ε is the domestic inflation rate which is also the peso depreciation rate against the dollar
Simplifying equation (1) and combining equations (2), (4), and (6) leads to (7) and (10) shows how the optimal default rate depends on the interest rate of the risky foreign debt. The arbitrage condition (3) also relates the default rate to the interest rate i
In a perfect-foresight equilibrium the default rate that the market expects, equation (3), must be equal to the default rate the government finds optimal for given market expectations, equations (7) and (10).
Together these conditions can give rise to multiple equilibria (figure 1).
In figure 1 there are two equilibria if the government can not precommit to honor both its debt and its exchange rate peg. The government's loss is smaller in the low default equilibrium (i TW1 ). However, there is no possibility to ensure that this better equilibrium is realized as the government cannot credibly commit to not validate expectations if the bond market settles on the high default equilibrium's interest rate (i TW2 ). The high default equilibrium also implies a higher inflation and depreciation rate (see equation 9), as the increased interest rate leads to higher interest expenditures for the government. An improvement in the fundamentals shifts the government's η-i-curve to the southeast.
What does this analysis imply for the security of foreign debt and the viability of a fixed exchange rate regime? In principle, a sovereign government can always renege on its debt if the economic conditions warrant a default. Similarly, a sovereign government can always abandon a currency peg if the economic conditions make a realignment advantageous. Governments abstain from using these escape clauses if they face large enough fixed costs of defaulting C η and of realigning C ε . These costs could include the political embarrassment, the loss of credibility, and the output losses countries typically -11 -face in the aftermath of currency or debt crashes (see e.g. Dooley 2000 , Rose 2002 , and Rose and Spiegel 2002 . Without these fixed costs governments would always choose the twin crisis instead a currency or a debt crisis. As the variable costs are quadratic in the devaluation and the default rate it would be more favorable to opt for the twin crisis to balance these costs.
With fixed default and devaluation costs the loss function is
In the following we contrast the purely discretionary regime (twin crisis) analyzed so far with
(1) a no-default regime, in which the default rate η is constrained to be zero but devaluation is possible (currency crisis only), and (2) a fixed exchange rate regime, in which the depreciation rate ε is restricted to zero but default is possible (debt crisis only).
Twin and Currency Crises
In a first step, we compare the purely discretionary policy (twin crisis) with the regime, in which the government can credibly commit to honor its debt and finances its expenditures by inflation and the associated devaluation (currency crisis only). Combining equations (9) and (11) (10) is 1   02  12   2  2   2  02  12   2   2  02  12  02  12 . Accordingly, the loss function under the currency crisis L CU is obtained by combining equations (8) and (11) and setting η=0
2 .
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Both loss functions are increasing in the interest rates with i
The twin crisis has the benefit that the government can balance the variable costs of a devaluation and a default by using two policy instruments instead of only one in the case of a currency crisis. However, the twin crisis has the disadvantage of the additional fixed costs of the default. With high interest rates the twin crisis is more attractive as these fixed costs become less important. Also, with a higher debt service the government can reduce its financing requirements to a larger degree for a given default rate. Therefore, with higher interest rates it is more likely that the government does not only devalue but also defaults.
For interest rates lower than i r the loss in the case of the currency crisis is smaller than the loss under the twin crisis and it is optimal for the government to devalue only. In figure 2 the risk free world interest rate i* and the market interest i TW2 are both to the left of i r . In this case the government only devalues and the risk free interest i* is realized. there is only a currency crisis if the market expects the government to honor its debt, and an equilibrium under the same fundamentals in which there is a twin debt and currency crisis if the market expects the government to renege on its debt.
In an analogous way a deterioration of the fundamentals, e.g. an increase in public expenditures or debt, also increases the likelihood of a twin crisis as the point of intersection between the two loss functions moves to the left and the interest rate i r declines. The larger the financing requirements the more likely a currency crisis leads to a twin crisis, in which the government not only devalues but also defaults on its debt.
For a detailed discussion of the properties of the loss functions see Herz (2003) .
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Twin and Debt Crises
In a second step, we compare the twin crisis with a debt crisis, i.e. a regime, in which the government proclaims to not devalue and instead finances its expenditures by defaulting on its debt. The necessary default rate in the case of a debt crisis is given by combining (7) and (8) 
The default rate in case of a debt crisis obviously has to exceed the default rate in case of a twin crisis in which the government finances its expenditures by a combination of default and seignorage, i.e. η DE > η TW . Accordingly, the resulting interest rate is higher in the case of a debt crisis, i.e. i DE > i TW .
The loss function in the case of the twin crisis is again For high expected default rates and subsequent high interest rates, namely for i > i r , the government is going to default only (see figure 4 ). The default rates in the case of the twin crisis and the debt crisis both converge to 100% for increasing interest rates and therefore the variable cost of the two types of crises are very similar for high interest rates. By defaulting only the government can then avoid the fixed cost of a devaluation that arise in the twin crisis. As a result the loss under the debt crisis is -15 -always smaller than the loss under the twin crisis for (very) high interest rates (for a detailed discussion see Herz 2003) .
If there exists exactly one intersection between the two loss functions than a situation of multiple equilibria can exist similar to the situation discussed above. Such a situation is likely if the fixed and variable cost of a devaluation are relatively low so that i TW < i r < i DE holds (see figure 4) . Then a twin crisis with the lower interest rate i TW is realized if the market participants expect the government to both default and devalue and a debt crisis with the higher interest rate i DE is attained if the market participants expect the government to default only. 3 The government cannot make sure that the better equilibrium, i.e., the twin crisis with the lower default rate is realized as it cannot bind itself to not renege on its exchange rate peg.
How does an improvement in the credibility of the exchange rate peg change the government's decision? Let us assume that the costs of a devaluation are increased by making it more difficult and costly for the government to give up the exchange rate peg, e.g. via a currency board, so that i r < i TW < i DE holds. In this case the government is always going to choose the debt crisis and the equilibrium with the higher default rate and the higher interest rate i DE is attained. Strengthening the fixed exchange rate regime can therefore increase the likelihood and the severity of a debt crisis as the government is left with only one instrument to finance its expenditures. Thus, sound fiscal policies are especially important if governments want to fix their exchange rate.
Taken together currency and debt crises are generally caused by the interactions between fundamental and expectational effects. The simultaneous occurrence of currency and debt crises can be caused by common fundamental factors and/or internal contagion effects from one crisis to the other. This -
Empirical Analysis

Data
There are two basic approaches to define currency crises. Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency crisis as a nominal depreciation of the currency of at least 25% p.a. and a change in the rate of depreciation that is at least 10%. Following Eichengreen et al. (1995) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , Glick and Hutchison (1999) define currency crises according to an average of exchange-rate and reserve changes to account for successful as well as unsuccessful speculative attacks. We follow Frankel and Rose (1996) 's definition because our theoretical model focuses on successful currency attacks.
To define debt crises we refer to the date of the Paris Club debt reschedulings (treatments) (see Sy (2003) for "sovereign distress" as an alternative measure of debt crises). The Paris Club is an informal 3 For i r < i TW < i DE the debt crisis with the interest rate i DE is realized and for i TW < i DE < i r the twin crisis with the interest rate i TW is the only outcome.
-17 -group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor nations (see Paris Club 2003) . Debtor countries can initiate negotiations to reschedule their debt, which are typically concluded within up to six months.
Rescheduling is a means of providing a country with debt relief through a postponement and, in the case of concessional rescheduling, a reduction in debt service obligations. To account for the negotiation process between the onset of the debt crisis and the reschedulings we use one-year ahead treatment as an indicator for the debt crisis in the current year. So if there is a treatment in 2001, then
we record the year 2000 as having debt crisis.
In our sample there are 111 currency only crises, 126 debt only crises, and 24 twin crises (table 2). As is evident from table 2 a debt crisis is much more likely to occur when there is a contemporary currency crisis and vice versa. A debt crisis occurred in 10.9 per cent of the cases when there was no currency crisis, while it occurred in 17.8 per cent of the cases where there was a currency crisis.
Accordingly, the likelihood of a currency crisis was 9.7 per cent if there was no debt crisis and 16 per cent in case of a debt crisis. Tables 3a and 3b provide some additional information on the time pattern between debt and currency crises. Table 3a gives the frequency of currency crises conditioned on whether there is a debt crisis in year t-1, and table 3b presents the frequency of debt crises conditioned on whether there is a currency crisis in year t-1. Tables 3a and 3b suggest that currency crises tend to lead debt crises, while a reverse link also has strong support. Table 4a and 4b, which give similar information for the case of a two year lag, suggest that currency crises tend to lead debt crises, while a reverse link has little support.
-18 -Obviously, these summary statistics only provide a univariate analysis of the correlation between debt and currency crises, and do not take into account macroeconomic factors.
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Statistical Model
The model
In this section we analyze the role of common macroeconomic factors and internal contagion from one type of crisis to the other for the occurrence of twin crises, i.e. the simultaneous occurrence of debt and currency crises. We also test for the Granger-type causality between the debt and currency crises. 
No serial correlation exists between the shock terms, which is not a strong assumption if we include enough lags of t X , t y 1 and t y 2 . o level and structure of debt: the ratio of external debt over GDP, net inflows of foreign direct investment over total external debt ratio; short-term debt over total external debt ratio; government deficit over GDP ratio, o debt services: debt service over GDP ratio.
• monetary conditions: domestic credit growth rate, real exchange rate overvaluation, foreign reserves over imports ratio.
• other macroeconomic indicators: domestic and world GDP growth rate,
• structural variables (original sin): real GDP per capita and country size, The construction of the exchange rate overvaluation is similar to Frankel and Rose (1996) .
Overvaluation is defined as the deviation from purchasing power parity which is measured as the country-specific average bilateral real exchange rate with the US dollar over the sample. We proxy the world GDP growth rate with the U.S. real GDP growth. We assume that no correlation exists between 
Estimation results
Our main estimation results can be summarized as follows. First, when estimating simultaneously the * 1t y equation (currency crisis) and the * 2t y equation (debt crisis), we find strong evidence for a Granger-type causality from debt crises to currency crises, and weak evidence for a Granger-type causality from currency crises to debt crises (see table 5 y equation (debt crisis) is 0.27, which is different from zero only at the 8% significance level. We have not included any contemporary effect from the occurrence of a debt crisis on the currency crisis and vice versa.
Secondly, we find strong evidence that debt and currency crises have common fundamental causes. We find that reserve over imports ratio, domestic GDP growth rate, and FDI over external debt affect both currency and debt crises. External debt over GDP, domestic credit growth rate, overvaluation, and the log of GDP as a proxy for original sin affect the currency crises, but not the debt crises (table 5) . Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2002) find that the debt service due over the government revenue ratio, one-period lagged short-term debt, and one-period lagged foreign reserve are significant factors for the debt crisis. Our results are partially consistent with theirs in that foreign reserve is an important factor for the debt crisis. However, we do not find that the debt service due and the one-period lagged shortterm debt are significant.
Thirdly, the correlation ρ (rho) across the shock terms ε 1t and ε 2t is -.0001, which is not significantly different from zero. So it is unlikely that there are unobserved common macroeconomic factors that affect both crises. Also, it is not likely that there is contemporary contagion between currency and debt crises.
Fourthly, we also include as structural variables the GDP per capita and country size as a proxy for original sin effects (see Eichengreen and Hausman 2002) . Both of theses measures are not significant in debt crisis equation at conventional significance levels. However, the (log) level of GDP affects the currency crises. Its coefficient is 0.096, different from 0 at the 1% significance level. This suggests that among developing countries, as the GDP level goes up, a currency crisis is more likely to occur. This could be due to the fact that economically bigger countries are more likely to participate in international market transactions.
Finally, we find that the M3 over total external debt has a significant impact on the debt crisis. The coefficient for M3 over total external debt is -0.15, significantly different from 0 at 2% level. This is consistent with our hypothesis that as the money supply goes up the inflation tax yields more revenues relative to the default, so that the debt crisis will be less likely to occur. M3 over total external debt has no significant impact on the currency crisis, however.
Sensitivity Analysis
To get a better understanding of the role of the direct linkages between the two types of crises relative to the role of the common factors we also estimate each crisis separately without including the other crisis as predetermined explanatory variable and compare our results with previous work that estimates currency crisis only (e.g. Frankel and Rose 1996) and the debt crisis only (e.g. Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2002). We use the Probit model for each crisis. As far as the macroeconomic variables are concerned, the results from the individual estimations (in table 6a, 6b) are similar to the joint estimation results in table 5. This is consistent with the finding in table 5 that the correlation across error terms (rho) is not significantly different from 0. However, the log-likelihood of the joint estimation is -728.1 (table 5) , while the sum of log-likelihoods for Table 6a and 6b is -737.44 . So joint estimation in table   5 is better in that it has a higher log-likelihood, which is consistent with the significant coefficient of lagged debt (currency) crisis indicator in the currency (debt) crisis equation.
A major point in our analysis is the possible role of one type of crisis on the other class of crisis after controlling for other common fundamental factors. Therefore, we jointly estimate the two equations with the same lag length for fundamentals as well as crises and get results similar to those in table 5.
We still have the following key results: the correlation across error terms( rho) is not significantly different from 0; and one-year lagged reserve over imports ratio and one-year lagged domestic GDP growth rate are the common factors (see table 7 ). For the debt crisis, FDI over external debt ratio now is different from 0 only at 14% significance level instead of the 7% level as in table 5. We do not want to overinterpret the results when the fundamental variables have many lags, in that there can be high correlation among them. For example, the correlation between "M3 over external debt ratio" and its one-year lag is as high as 0.98.
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2002) use a four-year window for the debt crisis, because they want to distinguish the beginning of a new crisis from the continuation of the preceding one. They treat crises beginning within four years since the end of the past crisis as the continuation of the crisis, and they analyze the onset of the debt crisis only. We use Paris Club treatments as debt crisis indicators which are less autocorrelated than the indicators employed by Detragiache and Spilimbergo. Therefore we impose only a one-year window, and get results that are similar to our baseline estimates (see table 8). Table 8 shows that reserve over imports ratio, FDI over external debt, and M3 over total external debt still have significant impact on debt crisis occurrence. But domestic GDP growth rate is not as significant as in table 5.
Note that we use M3 over Debt and Debt over GDP in regressions of table 5. Instead of these two variables, we also try the following two variables: external debt over GDP, and money over GDP. For the currency crisis equation, external debt over GDP still has a significant negative coefficient, while money over GDP has no effect. For the debt crisis equation, external debt over GDP has a positive coefficient and different from 0 at 7% significance level. Again money over GDP has no effect on the debt crisis (table 9).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have systematically investigated the potential linkages between debt and currency crises. Our starting point was the question whether the strong contemporary association between these two types of crises is caused by linkages between the debt and currency crisis or by common macroeconomic factors.
We find Granger-type causality between debt and currency crises. One-year lagged debt crises can significantly help predict currency crises, while two-year lagged currency crisis also has some weak power in predicting debt crises. Our empirical results indicate that some macroeconomic variables help predict debt as well as currency crises. Low FDI relative to external debt, low foreign reserve relative to imports and low GDP growth rate all increase the likelihood of debt and currency crises. These results are a first indication that common macroeconomic fundamentals play an important role for the occurrence of twin crises. This broader view on both debt and currency crises strengthens the role of sound macroeconomic policies. By pursuing stability orientated policies governments can earn a double dividend of lowering the likelihood of debt as well as currency crises.
-25 -The results presented in this paper are a first step in evaluating and understanding the complex linkages between debt and currency crises which can give rise to twin crises. Evidently, examining how the government deals with single crises and how this affects default and devaluation expectations helps to better understand when single crises give rise to twin crises. -27 - 
